Policy Development Studies

Number 8

POPULATION AND CONFLICT:

NEW DIMENSIONS OF POPULATION DYNAMICS

Nazli Choucri

United Nations Fund for Population Activities

FOREWORD

The pervasiveness of population issues can be seen today in almost all aspects of human society. While our understanding of these issues has greatly increased over the last decade and a half, the implications of population dynamics for conflict behaviour have not been well explained. Population, conflict and their interaction may be important factors in determining the kind of world we will face for the remaining decades of this century and those of the next.

While the absence of population related pressures does not guarantee peace, these pressures could increase the probability of conflict. This is particularly true when such additional aggravating factors as widening economic disparities, worsening environmental conditions and dwindling natural resources are also present in countries.

This report by Professor Nazli Choucri brings into focus the role of population dynamics in conflict manifestations. It also underscores the need to resolve population issues within a development framework if prosperity and peace for mankind are to be ensured.

The UNFPA is pleased to see this report appear in time for the International Conference on Population in 1984 and hopes that this report in the Policy Development Studies series will advance the understanding of a complex and important issue.

Rafael M. Salas

Executive Director

New York United Nations Fund for

June 1983 Population Activities

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: ISSUES IN CONTEXT

Views at the 1974 World Population Conference

Post Bucharest

New Dimensions

DIMENSIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

International Migration

Internal Migration

Ethnicity

Perceptions of Governments

International Conference on Population of 1984

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: A PARTIAL ACCOUNTING

Conflict in International Relations

The Structure of Conflict

The Role of Demographic Factors

THE CENTRAL PROPOSITIONS

Crisis Factors

Intermediary Factors

Some Connecting Insights

Government Policy

CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT

The Role of Resources and Technology

Critical Interactions

Critical Issues for the Future

POPULATION DYNAMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

National Security and International Population Assistance

Security and Self-Reliance

Paths to Security and Peace

Conclusion: A Necessary Strategy for Security

NOTES

LIST OF TABLES

1 Rates of Population Growth by Selected Regions

2 Relative Changes in Birth Rates in Developing Countries with Population of 10 Million and Over, 1965-70 and 1975-80

3 Characterizations of Conflict

4 Violent Conflicts Summary by Regions and Time Periods

5Types of Violent Conflict

6 Nonviolent Conflicts Summary by Regions and Time Periods

7Types of Nonviolent Conflict

8 Global Expenditures on Development and Arms Trade

PREFACE

I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. R.M. Salas, Executive Director of The United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), for inviting in September 1980 a group of scholars to discuss the broad issue of the relationship between population and conflict. This meeting provided the initial basis for a conference on population and conflict, held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology one year later to review the evidence at hand. This report reflects the worthy contributions made by the participants attending the conference and highlights some distinctive patterns relating population to conflict behaviour at individual, national, and international levels. I believe that this report calls attention to new issues of concern in the field of population.

I am grateful to Dr. A. Thavarajah, Director, Policy and Evaluation Division, UNFPA, for his direction and contribution to this project and to his staff associates, Dr. S. L. N. Rao and Ms. Linda Sherry, for their constructive revisions and valuable suggestions. I thank them for the work and effort put into the production of this report as well as to Diane Beth Hyman for her organizational and editorial support for the study as a whole and to Carol Conway as research assistant.

Nazli Choucri

Professor of Political Science Boston, Mass. May 1983 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

INTRODUCTION:

ISSUES IN CONTEXT

Until recently attention to population issues primarily has focused on the consequences of high fertility in many parts of the world. Rapidly growing numbers of people create social and economic burdens which cannot be ignored.1 However, evidence suggests that population problems include not only births and deaths, but also demographic change as it affects national and international politics.2 Conflict is a central feature of all political behaviour, at all levels of human interaction. Thus, the prominence of population variables in shaping political behaviour places population and conflict in close proximity. This report highlights some of the linkages between population variables and conflict behaviour.

Despite the international communitys increasing awareness of population issues, a curious dichotomy continues to prevail between those who reduce population matters strictly to questions of fertility and mortality, rather than their broader implications, and those who view population issues in social and economic terms. Yet among both factions there remains a remarkable disregard for the potential political implications of population factors and their possible im pact on conflict behaviour. More importantly, there is a continued lack of awareness by both policy-making and academic communities of the close links between population and security. At a time when military expenditures are escalating and insecurities abound, the challenges mount in an already burdened international environment. It would be the height of myopia to continue to disregard the increasing evidence concerning the relationship of population variables to conflict dynamics.

Views at the 1974 World Population Conference

The World Population Conference of 1974, held in Bucharest, Romania, was a landmark in the international communitys growing recognition of population issues. In the wake of calls for a New International Economic Order, the 1974 World Population Conference drew attention to the relationship between population and development and to competing strategies for change.3 The major positions delineated at the Conference reflected both differing views of the population "problem" held by individual participants and differing approaches to its resolution. At least four different perspectives were represented. They illustrate the continuing diversity in the international communitys appreciation of, and approach to, population issues.4

First was the view that population problems are largely problems of inequality in wealth and access to resources. Eliminating poverty and conditions of inequality would, it was argued, result in fertility decline. Direct interventions would not contribute as effectively to fertility decline as would social and economic development.

Second was the view that countries do, in fact, have population problems that directly hinder development. High rates of population growth were recognized as having a detrimental effect on development. Therefore, policies designed to reduce fertility would be welcome, providing they were incorporated in the broader fabric of social and economic development.

Third was the view that strong population controls would be required to bring population growth rates in balance with the rate of development. High rates of population growth were seen as having a detrimental effect on economic development.

Fourth was the view that there is no population problem in the abstract, but only as tied to modes of production. Therefore, population policies as such would not be required. Exploitation of developing countries by "capitalist developed countries" is responsible for both national and international social inequities.

This four-fold perspective reflects more generally the two competing orientations expressed at the World Population Conference of 1974. On the one hand was the belief, expressed strongly by most developing Countries, that demographic variables are wholly a function of social and economic development and that overall social transformation will result in demographic adjustments. Therefore, attainment of a New International Economic Order is essential to the resolution of population problems. On the other hand, was the view that demographic variables are an essential aspect of social and economic development. Attention to population issues, therefore, must accompany the formulation of any social policy. Demographic policies must be considered as essential to overall development as economic policies, and specific attention has to be given to population interventions.

These competing perspectives focused mainly on the position of population policy in the overall priorities for development. Population policy in this context was viewed largely in terms of policies designed to control fertility. Demographic issues continued to be defined in terms of births, deaths, and attendant social implications. The full range of population variables--size, composition, distribution, and change--was not the subject of explicit debate or discussion.

Since the 1974 World Population Conference, there have been numerous international conferences which have drawn attention to the problems of developing countries and to overall international transformation and change. During the 1970s, population issues assumed a more prominent position on all international agendas. Yet while discussions of issues such as urbanization, pollution and desertification have included demographic dimensions, the focus of such discussions has mainly been the concern of developing countries for development. Thus, even though demographic considerations have been integrated with general economic development, they have been implicitly viewed as exogenous to development. In addition, nowhere in the international communitys agenda have the conflict producing effects of population variables, nor the changes in demographic characteristics due to conflict situations, been considered. Conversely, the contribution of demographic change to conflict resolution and the prospects for peace likewise have been ignored.

Post Bucharest

During the 1970s, the international communitys concern with demographic issues assumed two new guises: regional population conferences and global meetings of experts focusing on select facets of population issues. Such activities not only have broadened the basic discussion of economic development, but also have changed the idiom of international discourse. Throughout, the developing countries have insisted that their developmental problems are fundamentally different from those faced by industrial countries at an earlier historical period and that their solutions also would differ. This insistence by the developing countries on the importance of defining issues in terms relevant and appropriate to them is by far the most significant outcome of the long deliberations of the 1970s. This trend is part and parcel of the increasing politicization which surfaced at the 1974 World Population Conference, and promises to remain as a necessary consequence of international change and transformation during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

There have been several major United Nations Conferences since the 1974 World Population Conference (excluding special sessions of the General Assembly). They have dealt with food, the role of women, employment, human settlements, desertification, technical cooperation among developing countries, agrarian reform and rural development, science and technology for development, the management of radio frequencies, and new renewable sources of energy. Although these global forums took account of demographic issues, none of them focused explicitly and comprehensively on population factors.⁵

Conferences dealing specifically with population and development that have taken place since 1974 include: International Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development, Columbo, Sri Lanka, 1979; the 1979 Latin American Conference on Population and Development Planning in Cartagena, Columbia; the 1980 International Conference on Population and the Urban Future in Rome, Italy; the 1981 Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development in Beijing, China; and the 1981 International Conference on Family Planning in the 1980s in Jakarta, Indonesia. While these meetings have helped to maintain global concern for population issues, the resulting recommendations have not yet reached the level of global diplomatic discourse.

The International Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development issued the Colombo Declaration in September 19796 which recognized that world population could continue to rise to eight to ten billion people by the year 2000. This would mean a need for nearly an additional billion jobs in developing countries. The Conference Declaration called on governments to facilitate the attainment of goals of the New International Economic Order. The role of legislators as active agents in the development process was put forth as a major tenet of the Conference. This factor in itself both further legitimized and politicized concerns over population issues and their developmental implications.

The target of one billion dollars in international population assistance by 1984, constituted the Conferences specific recommendation regarding financial allocations.

The Rome Declaration on Population and the Urban Future, issued in September 1980, argued that strategies sustained by national legislation and financial support should focus on three areas: the establishment of comprehensive national population policies, organization and policies for balanced development, and focus on the amelioration of conditions in urban areas. This conference is important for its recognition of urban-related problems, a sphere where many of the most glaring population-conflict linkages are the most readily apparent. Recognition of these linkages would have strengthened the Rome Declarations thrust immeasurably.

The Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development held in Beijing, China in October 1981, issued the Beijing Declaration on Popula tion and Development. Sixty per cent of the worlds population is located in Asia. If present trends continue, the declaration stated, 90 per cent of the worlds poor will be in that region. Almost 60 per cent of the total population of Asia is under 25 years of age, a factor that has critical implications for development. However, Asian parliamentarians made no use of the accumulating evidence regarding the implication of youthful populations for social disruption and potential conflict. The evidence comes, admittedly, from social science analysis in the West and cannot, therefore, be transferred uncritically to other regions. The Beijing Declaration expanded further its recognition and affirmation of the role of legislators in the formation of population policies and as critical actors in the process. The Beijing Declarations statement that "peace, national security, and stability are preconditions for development" is a major landmark in the international communitys acknowledgment of the many dimensions of population issues.

Any global agenda for action during the decade of the 1980s should emphasize efforts to implement the directives outlined in calls for a New International Economic Order that were expressed in almost every major international conference throughout the 1970s. In the process, demographic considerations, and a host of attendant population issues, will remain in the forefront. The international meetings since the 1974 World Population Conference reiterated the multi-faceted aspects of population issues. As a result, population variables have been recognized as essential factors--more than building blocks, mortar, and concrete--for development. Nonetheless, other dimensions of the population issue--those that bear directly on conflict propensities and national security--remain to be recognized.

By the end of the 1 970s, the international community was manifesting its concern with developmental problems in another way through intensive analysis by international groups of scholars in conjunction with decision-makers from different parts of the world. One important consequence of this new trend has been a set of international reports on the development issues. Several reports are particularly noteworthy as they represent the evolution of developmental thinking. These include: World Population and Development: Challenges and Prospects (1979), sponsored by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities; The Global 2000 Report to the President (1980), a report prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality and the United States Department of State; North-South. A Program for Survival (1980), otherwise known as the Brandt Report; and A National Agenda for the Eighties, written by the Presidents Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, which focuses exclusively on the United States.

World Population and Development: Challenges and Prospects. edited by Philip M. Hauser, focuses on the relationship between population and economic development.9 Facets of demographic factors related to economic development. such as high fertility and growth rates, mortality, migration, health issues, and population composition and distribution are examined, as are the labour force and overall aspects of population characteristics. This volume is comprehensive in its identification of population-related problems. A notable omission, however, is an explicit analysis of the relationship between demographic change and conflict. However, Hauser and his contributors do state that economic development is the intermediate factor between population growth and violence. They indicate that only if developed countries were unwilling to cooperate with the developing countries in pursuing the latters economic growth, would population pressures perhaps contribute to violence.

The Global 2000 Report to the President projects world population in the year 2000 to be 5.9 to 7 billion people and does not anticipate an appreciable decline in the rate of growth.10 The reports treatment of demographic issues reveals a singular lack of appreciation of the overall implications of demographic change and of the potential impact of such change on conflict and violence. The report analyzes global trends and predicts that dramatic changes in demographic characteristics induced by conflict or violence can be expected to create further changes in relations among nations. It argues for greater international cooperation, coordinated by the United States, but provides few specific directives or suggestions.

The Brandt Report. a combined effort of a distinguished group of individuals in public service, argues that vastly increasing population inevitably creates problems: in providing food, jobs, shelter, education, and health services; in mitigating absolute poverty; and in meeting the colossal financial and administrative needs of rapid urbanization. 1 It projects world population at 6 to 6.5 billion people by the year 2000, stabilizing in the next century at between 8 and 15 billion. The report stresses the need to stabilize world population as soon as possible, in order to avert massive dislocations, and the need for population policies to accompany economic growth. It notes the effectiveness of family-planning programmes, with particular reference to specific developing countries, and argues that the world will be racked by economic, social, and political conflict unless fur ther efforts are made to assist in reducing the unfulfilled demands of poorer states.

Among the recommendations of the Brandt Report are the following:

development policies must include national population programmes aimed at generating a satisfactory balance between population and resources and at making family planning freely available; international assistance and support of population programmes must be increased to meet the unmet needs for such aid; migrant labourers should be assured of good treatment; and home countries and countries of immigration should coordinate their policies and design ways of stabilizing demand for migrants and for regulating remittances. 12

While the report is concerned with population as a pressure on resources and the environment, conflict and violence as a result of population pressure are not taken into account, nor are they singled out as prominent side effects of worldwide population growth. In this respect the Brandt Report shares with the other inter national assessments a notable lack of recognition of the conditions under which rapid population growth could lead to large-scale conflict and of the conditions under which conflict, within and between countries, could result in massive popu lation dislocations.

A NationalAgenda for the Eighties is an overall assessment of the United States economic and social prospects for the 1980s. The demographic back ground for issues likely to arise in the 1980s is the subject of one chapter. It states that demographic shifts in the United States will shape the future demands of the society and the ways in which problems are defined and potentially resolved. The most important aspect of this assessment is that the future of America is one of greater ethnic and racial pluralism, a growing population of very old dependents, and a new structure in the composition of the labour force--all creating new demo graphic conditions and new problems for social policy. Again, however, conflict is not explicitly examined, nor are the demographic conditions that lead to violence.

In sum, the most notable international assessments during the latter part of the l970s, and the early 1980s, share a singular disregard for the conflict-producing dynamics engendered by rapid demographic change both within and across nations. Nowhere in any of these reports is there an overall accounting of the multi ple effects of population and of the multiple dimensions of demographic characteristics. The Brandt Report comes closest to providing a comprehensive ac count of population-related issues, most notably those pertaining to mobility, but even that report omits a discussion of conflicts due to changing demographic factors. To some extent, this omission may be due to a genuine lack of comprehension of such interconnections, but it also may be due to a lack of appreciation for the incidence and extent of conflict and violence internationally. While no one fully knows how many "deadly quarrels" exist at any point in time, nor their social and demographic implications, it is still a certainty that violent conflict is pervasive.14

New Dimensions

Despite the great diversity of views on population issues, there is an emerging consensus that population factors create pressures and demands on a society and that, if these demands are unmet, social dislocation, conflict, and violence may occur. 15 What is not fully appreciated is that conflict and violence will in themselves create profound demographic consequences. Refugees are the most obvious of these consequences, but there are other consequences which may be less visible, but are no less profound and poignant. Increasingly, it is believed that changes in the size, distribution, and composition of populations are critical factors which can strongly influence political relations within and between nations. Demographic factors can affect the particular patterns of national and international behaviour which result in various types of conflict16

This report assesses the political nature of demographic change and its relationship to national and international conflict. The inter-disciplinary, crosscultural, and historical evidence reviewed herein has important policy implications, both nationally and internationally. It also demonstrates that, regardless of the types of policy orientation to which a nation subscribes, thorough consideration of the consequences of rapid and pervasive demographic change is essential to the formulation of viable domestic and international, social and economic policies. Among the most critical of these consequences are the political effects, particularly the impact on conflict within and between nations. Lest the charge be made that the evidence is posed in the negative--stressing conflict factors--the incidence of peace, and peaceful resolution of conflict situations, rests most profoundly upon an initial understanding of conflict-producing dynamics. This report thus can be viewed as a modest effort to highlight some aspects of the eternal "conflict spira1,"¹⁷ which are an essential prerequisite for understanding the nature of peace and embarking on initiatives for the attainment of peace.

DIMENSIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

Despite difficulties in providing accurate assessments, United Nations data indicate that world population increased by 46.2 per cent between 1960 and 1980, from 3.03 to 4.43 billion.1 According to the "medium projections, population in developing countries is currently growing at a rate of 0.7 per cent annually, with a doubling time of 100 years. By contrast, population in developing countries is grow ing at a rate of 2.08 per cent annually with a doubling time of only 35 years. The variance is due mainly to the difference in levels of crude birth and death rates in developed and developing countries. Dynamics of population growth appear to change rapidly--both in terms of sheer numbers and the underlying causes of changes in numbers. There is today a notable trend toward deceleration, namely a decline in fertility. United Nations projections indicate that the annual rate of global population growth could be about 1.5 by the turn of the century.3 Nonetheless, it is still estimated that net additions to world population will increase from 80 million in the early 1980s, to 90 million by the year 2000.4

Rates of population growth for various regions of the world are presented in table 1. It can be seen that the population of developed countries grew only slightly. In the developing regions, although population growth rates remained at over 2 per cent for both time periods expressed in the table, there is clear evidence of a decline in growth rates during the period of analysis, with the exception of Africa where the overall growth rate has increased. Demographers estimate that trends until the year 2000 point to slower growth rates in all regions except Africa.

While the United Nations projects a continued slowing of population growth in both the developed and developing regions, it is expected that developing countries will experience approximately a fifty per cent increase in their populations in the next two decades. For the developed countries, the anticipated growth for the same period is much lower--about 8 per cent in Europe, 17 per cent in the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an average of 12.5 for all developed countries. These projections are based on estimates of fertility and mortality. Table 2 illustrates recent changes in the level of birth rates between 1965--70 and 1975-80 in developing countries. The near universal decline in birth rates indicated will have implications for future changes in the world demographic structure.

At present it is estimated that the world population in the year 2000 will be 6.1 billion. This estimate is about 20 per cent lower than previous projections. Although the major changes occurring during the l970s is encouraging, the burden of future numbers on this globe remains extensive.

Source:United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1980, ST/ESA/SER.A/78 table 2, p. 7.

International Migration

In addition to fertility and mortality, another important aspect of demo graphic change in the 1970s was in the observed patterns of international migration and in the expectation of further changes in response to new trends in economic relations.

There are three kinds of migration across national borders: (1) conventional flows tied to the historical process of statehood, such as those between Europe and the United States, or migrations to New Zealand and Australia; (2) migration of workers to industrial countries, such as Southern European migration to the indus trial countries of Europe, or Latin American migrants to the United States in search of employment opportunities; and (3) dislocation of populations created by either voluntary or involuntary mobility (for instance, refugees and nomads).

None of these flows is exclusive. For example, conventional migration to the United States from Europe has been augmented by illegal migrants and by refugees. In cases where the conjunction of these flows may result in the foreign population being a high proportion of the total population, mobility itself can be come an important issue of public policy. The problems of refugees, recognized as critical since the inception of the United Nations, shows little sign of abatement. While the number of persons dislocated by violent conflict remains unclear, demographers estimate it to be in the millions.

Another type of migration, increasing in scale so vastly that it may be considered as a new trend, is the movement of people among developing countries themselves. The causes are both historical and economic in nature--the result of interdependent labour markets. In the Middle East, for instance, migration within the region is one of the most distinctive consequences of economic changes taking place in the 1970s. The demand for labour, due to massive investment programmes in oil-rich states, has led to the pull of labour from adjacent economies.6 While an accurate estimate of stock and flows of labour migration is difficult to make, there is general agreement on the range of numbers involved. Although this type of mobility among developing countries appears most pronounced in the Middle East, it is also emerging as a phenomenon in Latin America, Asia and even in Africa. Oil price increases and new investment opportunities in the oil-exporting countries have been creating a new type of interdependence in the labour markets of some developing countries. It is too early, however, to tell whether this phenomenon is idiosyncratic to oil-related situations or whether we are witnessing a broader process of population mobility. The noticeable decline in oil prices during the early months of 1983 has already created a decline of economic activity in some countries resulting in migrant workers being sent back home. The reintroduction of returned migrants into their home economies may pose new policy issues for governments of both sending and receiving countries.

TABLE 2

Source:Adapted from table 2 in Rafael M. Salas. The State of World Population 1982. United Nations Fund for Population Activities. 1982.

Internal Migration

Rapid urbanization continues to be one of the most distinctive features of the demography of developing countries. The pull of cities persists in attracting workers from agricultural areas, contributing to the pace of social transformation and to pressures on urban centers. According to United Nations estimates, the world's urban population has doubled since mid-century and may well double again before the century is over. In 1950, there were seven very large cities of 5 million inhabitants. By 1981, there were 29 such cities; of these 19 were located in developing countries. By the year 2000, there may well be 59 such agglomerations, 47 of which will be in the developing countries. Trends in internal and external migration together make population mobility a critical demographic issue for many countries. In a recent survey, the United Nations found that 44 per cent of developing countries consider their high rate of natural increase a hindrance to development. Sixty per cent consider the current patterns of spatial distribution to be inappropriate.⁸ Trends in internal migration make population mobililty a critical demographic issue for many developing countries.

Ethnicity

Yet another major demographic dimension--in addition to fertility, mortality, growth, and migration--is change in the ethnic, religious and racial composition of a population. Ethnicity, a term which encompasses these diverse factors, is a major sociological determinant of national cohesion, a critical input in political processes, and the most basic element in individual self-definition. Self-definition can exert a powerful influence on individual behaviour in the immediate community, the larger society, and the state. No government anywhere can ignore the composition of its population or the location of various population elements, for these affect the very essence of statehood. Few countries in the world are completely homogeneous in ethnic, religious, and racial terms. Countries may differ in the extent to which ethnicity is a critical issue for public policy, but demographic diversity is almost unavoidably of concern to national governments. Ultimately, ethnicity may be the most critical demographic element for all national governments.

Perceptions of Governments

Among the most notable changes in perceptions of population issues over the past decade are the following: (1) governments increasingly recognize population as an area for policy development; (2) research and analysis have begun to take into account the interrelationship of population, resources, environment, and development; (3) some countries are making notable progress in establishing the necessary infrastructure for implementing population programmes, and (4) governments have increased their own allocations to population programmes while international assistance for population programmes has become more widespread.10

Governments representing about four-fifths of the world's population had adopted population policies by the mid-seventies. The 1974 World Population Conference and the resulting World Population Plan of Action, consolidated objectives and policies that had evolved overtime. Changes in government perceptions are reflected in the fact that about 80 per cent of the total population of the developing world is located in countries which state that their levels of fertility are too high and would like them reduced. Only 17 per cent of the population of developing countries have governments that are satisfied with their current levels of fertility. Increasingly, governments are considering population distribution and internal migration as problems requiring immediate attention. By 1980, 110 developing countries out of 126 considered the distribution of their population as a critical problem requiring formal responses.11

As a result of changes in perceptions, research on population issues has taken two important turns. At the macro-level, there is evidence of the linkages between population, environment, resources, and development. At the micro-level, there is evidence of the interconnection between social and economic variables that can reinforce the impact of population programmes if they are taken into account during policy development." There is also some evidence of a negative relationship between fertility level and socio-economic status. Research in the 1970s indicated that the important policy factors for reducing both fertility and mortality rates in developing countries include education of women, changes in the status of women brought about by shifts from traditional to new occupations, access to health and family planning, and changes in attitudes towards family formation.13

In sum, over the past decade a broader view of population has evolved which is no longer narrowly focused on issues of fertility and mortality. There has been a major change in perceptions of the relationships between population, resources, and the environment as they bear on development. This new view incorporates other important issues which are now recognized to be critical to national development. Among these are the status of women, composition and distribution of population, quality of life, and social equity. The international community now recognizes that a comprehensive development strategy must take into account the over all effects of population factors.

International Conference on Population of 1984

The major objectives of the 1984 International Conference on Population are: to strengthen and sustain the momentum already generated in population activities; to identify emerging problems for concerted action; and to initiate program mes in areas where no significant impact has yet been achieved. The decade of the 1970s witnessed, both at national and international levels, a growing awareness of population issues and an increasing commitment to population policies and programmes. Despite these achievements, there is a sense of unease, that not all aspects of population impact on society, policy and the economy have been understood, and that decision makers may be faced with yet further surprises emanating from demographic factors. National governments everywhere--in developed and developing countries alike--are invariably sensitized to the direct demographic underpinnings of their political system and their sense of national security is becoming more clearly tied to population activities. While these factors, and feelings, remain beyond the scope of the 1984 International Conference on Population, the evidence in this report points to the importance of appreciating the security dimensions of population.

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE:

A PARTIAL ACCOUNTING

Rendering an accurate accounting of the incidence of conflict at the international level is undoubtedly a most difficult task. The mere definition of what constitutes conflict remains a subject of disagreement, and a satisfactory resolution has yet to be made. Conflict analysis, the subfield of political inquiry that focuses on violence between and within nations, stresses the importance of covert as well as overt acts as constituting conflict. Over the past decades, political scientists have developed an internally consistent set of data on conflict behaviour that has been refined considerably and is now considered, in the scholarly community, to represent a fairly accurate account of overt conflict.1

Conflict in International Relations

The definition of international conflict utilized in the field, and employed in this chapter, is "an interstate security dispute" that generally involves "specific power-political aims and demands having direct impacts on national behaviour" and is "perceived internationally as being focused on political and security affairs."2 This definition includes political disputes that may not be violent in nature as well as violent disputes conventionally characterized as wars.

Following this definition it has been estimated that there have been 307 explicit conflicts between 1945 and 1980 (this is not presented as a comprehensive list of all conflicts during this period);8 191 of these were disputes "involving systematic use of military force, over a specific military objective(s), causing casualties and/or destruction of property." A profile of these 191 conflicts, well-documented in terms of parties to the dispute, objectives, targets, and overall evolution and resolution (if any) is the partial basis for the following account of the conflict record since 1945. Also included is a summary of 116' recorded political disputes that have not involved overt use of military force and conflicts that are largely internal, thus not involving the use of force or the crossing of national borders. These include situations in which domestic violence leads to internal displacement of persons. The fol lowing accounting, therefore, must be viewed as a conservative but comprehensive assessment of different categories of conflict in international relations. It demonstrates the extent to which conflict is as complex as it is pervasive.

TABLE 3

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CONFLICT

Colonial Conflict

The objective is to overthrow a colonial power

Wars of National Integration

The objective is to consolidate the political order around some legitimate central authority

Wars of National Expansion

Territorial aggrandizement appears as a major objective

Domestic Conflicts

Generated by Internal

Political Instability

The main contenders are competing national or native elites

Political Conflicts

a)purely political

b)purely political ideology

c)political, drawing upon population factors

The objective is to establish or maintain a sphere of influence

The objective is to establish or maintain a predominant ideology

The objective is to exploit specific population factors

Dynamic Mixed

Process Conflicts

Conflicts where the nature of the dis pute undergoes substantial transforma tion in the course of the conflict

Source: Nazli Choucri. Populatlon Dynamics and International Violence: Insights and Evidence. Lex ington. Mass.: D.C. Health Lexington Books, 1974, p. 115. Based on synthesis of prevailing classifi cations in political analysis. These characterizations were based initiatlyon analysis of conflict in develop. ing countries. They are generalized hereto all international conflicts.

The Structure of Conflict

While scholars do not yet agree as to why conflicts arise, therein an emerging consensus on characterizations of types of overt conflict.6 Table 3, drawing upon earlier studies, summarizes the broad characterizations of international conflict. It is generally agreed that conflicts unfold through a predictable and identifiable set of dynamics. Phases of conflict also are categorized from the emergence of political dispute to the overt expression of military hostilities.' Yet there is the issue of complexity. A conflict that might be initiated by one set of issues, may evolve to include additional and very different issues from those present at the outset of the conflict. The complex nature and transformation of conflict parameters are two of the factors most difficult to identify and characterize in international realities.

According to the Violent Conflicts Summary, table 4, one hundred and ninety-one conflicts involving use of military force have been identified as taking place between 1945-1980. By far the largest number (101), consisted of hostilities between developing regions.8 Only 75 of these conflicts can be identified clearly as disputes involving developed and developing countries. The remaining 15 violent conflicts concern hostilities between developed states. Thus the South-South conflict dimension has been the most frequent for international conflict involving military force during this period.

The incidence of conflict involving military force among developing regions themselves has increased steadily since 1940, in comparison with the decline in the number of such incidences between developed states. The trend in North-South conflicts was similar to that of developing countries until the decade 1970--79, at which point there was a dramatic decrease in North-South conflicts. The decline in the number of incidences during the past decade corresponds to the emergence of "détente" between the superpowers. Conflicts among the developing countries themselves have occurred mainly in Asia and Africa, as have conflicts between developed and developing countries. Conflict between developed states only has occurred in Europe.

In terms of types of violent conflict (see table 5) the majority of the overt conflicts can be characterized as those caused by internal political instability. Colonial conflicts and purely political conflicts rank second and third, respectively, in terms of frequency. Political conflicts with population factors and purely political conflicts with major ideological factors rank fourth and fifth in this characterization of conflict type. National integration conflicts and dynamic-mixed-process conflicts, whose nature changed overtime, rank sixth and seventh. National expansion conflicts rank eighth. Less than two per cent of all conflicts since World War II have been coded as involving "national expansion" as compared to 40 per cent of the conflicts which have involved specific population-related factors such as integration, ideology, population factors, and mixed processes involving a number of issues over time. Data on type, location and nature of conflicts, as presented in table 5, should be interpreted with caution since they are based on only the 191 conflicts examined here.

According to the data in table 6, it has been established that for the period 1945-1980 there have been 116 conflicts not involving the use of military force. Of these, 48 were between developed and developing countries; 43 between developing countries and 25 were between developed countries.

Data on types and location of non-violent conflicts, presented in table 7, indicate that the majority of such conflicts have been purely political in nature. Pure political conflicts involving major ideological factors rank second. Colonial conflicts and political conflicts with population factors rank third and fourth. Conflicts resulting from internal political instability rank fifth. Dynamic mixed process and national integration conflicts are equally ranked as sixth most frequently occurring non-violent conflicts. National expansion conflicts, in seventh place, account for fewer than one per cent of the total conflicts, while conflicts which are population-related account for over one third of the total non-violent conflicts.

Generally, over the past four decades, non-violent disputes among developing regions and among developed and developing countries have tended to increase in number. For the developed states, there has been a marked decrease in non-violent conflict since 1950. These trends are summarized in tables 6 and 7. Again, we caution the reader to remember that these statistics represent reliable, but small, data sets. They are presented here to indicate trends which may be deduced as the result of the data collection efforts of prominent scholars.

The Role of Demographic Factors

Of these 307 violent and non-violent conflicts, ethnic factors have had an important bearing on the nature and type of dispute involved in 47 per cent of the cases. Within the category of non-violent conflicts, 32 (or 27.6 per cent) had major ethnic factors, while 111 violent conflicts (58.1 per cent) had major ethnic factors. Population composition thus appears to be an important element in international disputes.

Detailed demographic information has been compiled for only 45 of these conflicts, but evidence regarding population-conflict links in international relations emerges from this set.9 This analysis, completed in 1974, continues to represent the only systematic study to date of the relationship between population and conflict. The evidence summarized here, and in the following chapter, points to the possibility of a broader basis of inference to the entire range of conflicts.

The 1974 study--which includes the relationship between population dynamics, resource availability, and technological development, on the one hand, and the behaviour of states, on the other--was completed in the year of the 1974 World Population Conference. Its purpose was to trace the international effects of different demographic, economic and military profiles. This was the first sys tematic study of conflicts to determine any demographic connections. It was based on comparisons of the super powers with smaller states, an examination of the actions and attributes of nations over time, and observation of the effects of sharp changes in power-related characteristics and their influence upon national behaviour. The variables intervening between population and violence, at the aggregate (macro) level, then became evident and specific linkages were delineated. One major finding of these analyses was that existence of 'non-aggressive" and "aggressive" systems can be traced largely to internal demographic structures. The 1974 analysis also considered additional evidence of the internal determinants of external conflict and armament competition, and found that there were theoretical as well as empirical linkages relating population variables to conflict behaviour and to violence.

Of the demographic profiles of the 45 conflicts examined at the time,10 we found that population variables played a critical role in 38. In only seven of the 45 cases did population variables have no appreciable influence on the development or conduct of the conflict.11 Additional evidence regarding the linkage of demo graphic factors to conflict which emerged as a result of this analysis can be summarized as follows:

- The current population emphasis on population size is largely misplaced and invariant over the time perspective of a specific conflict. Population composition and distribution, which generally have been ignored in popular. academic, and official circles, were shown to be of great importance in many of the conflicts examined.

- Population change tends to exacerbate the effects of size.

- Population distribution appears to be most susceptible to variation over the course of a conflict.

- Population composition also frequently appears to set the parameters of conflict situations.

In sum, population size, change, distribution, and composition are all linked in complex ways. Size and change factors seldom have more than background significance, because their effects are long term and indirect; any pressures generated by these two demographic factors are likely to manifest themselves through other population variables.12

The analysis of 45 cases demonstrated that rapid change in population dynamics--size. composition, distribution, and change--invariably generates problems that go beyond those derived from an increase in numbers alone. Assessment of the population issue must be made in quantitative and qualitative terms and placed in the context of the resources available to a society and its level of knowledge and skills 13

Some evidence disconfirms any relationship between density and conflict.14 However, other historical analyses, tracing the usual linkages between population variables on the one hand, and international conflict on the other, find a statistical ly significant casual linkage between population variables and international conflict through a set of intervening variables.

Our own detailed analysis of historical situations identified a four step process for conflict dynamics: (1) those factors that predispose toward national expansion; (2) those factors that lead to diplomatic conflicts at intersections of spheres of influence; (3) those factors that transfer diplomatic difficulties into military competitions; and (4) the more immediate factors or provocations that lead to overt violence.

THE CENTRAL PROPOSITIONS

The multiplicity of issues and linkages between population and conflict raised in the previous chapter may appear overwhelming, thus obscuring some robust and fundamental relations. For example, population variables affect conflict behaviour both directly and indirectly, and conflict processes in turn can have profound im pacts on demographic structure. Despite differences in levels of analysis, discipli nary orientation, and methodological approaches, the evidence so far points to some general conclusions. The most important one pertains to the interactive ef fects linking population, resources, and technology.

Man is critically dependent on his physical environment. As biological organ isms, human beings have certain basic needs. A growing population results in an increased demand for basic resources. The technology available to acquire such re sources and render them serviceable brings about environmental and social change. The more advanced the technology available to a society, the more varied the types and kinds of resources needed. Demands are likely to increase as techno logical advances change social perceptions of "needs." Technological advances, therefore, alter and influence economic activity, as well as political institutions and processes. Population increases, in conjunction with developments in technology, contribute to the familiar dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resource availability.

The following synthesis captures the most prominent consensus about the re lationship between population and conflict, given the evidence at hand. It is based on a study undertaken by a distinguished group of scholars from different disciplines, convened to assess the nature of the evidence to date:

(1) Demographic factors can lead to conflict behaviour, which in turn affects population characteristics. There is almost always an interactive and feedback relationship linking conflict to population, not a direct or linear one.

(2) Population size and growth, crowding and density, alone do not lead to vio lence. Population increase is not in itself the source of crowding, stress, and conflict.2 Although there is some relationship between crowding and pathological con ditions. there initially must be a critical mass, i.e., a population "at risk", amenable to violence or using violence as a preferred strategy.3

(3) Differential growth rates in population (size, composition, and distribu tion), access to resources. and access to technology contribute to the potential for conflict and to overt violence.4 Differentials in power variables and in demographic characteristics, such as the rate of growth of different ethnic groups, politicize population factors and make them conducive to conflict. Differential rates of growth are central to the evolution of the conflict spiral. The dynamics of conflict are imbedded in such differentials.5

(4) Conflict behaviour can influence demographic structure, creating changes in population variables. The existence of the conflict can itself politicize population variables. Demographic characteristics under these conditions are, or become, construed as political ones and, for all practical purposes, enter as political variables in the calculations of the antagonists. Coercive displacement of people can occur as a result of violent conflict.

(5) The age composition of a population is a powerful element in its tendencies to violence. Some evidence suggests that the younger the population and the higher the level of unemployment, the greater the propensities for violence. In a pro longed conflict, advantage is with the younger population.7 Age structure direct ly affects the political process, the political agenda, and the way in which social demands are articulated.

(6) Ethnic differences by themselves are not a direct source of conflict but ethnicity can heighten the importance of numbers in the conduct of conflict. Numerous overt conflicts since World War II have had a strong ethnic character and have involved resource scarcity.8 Segmental divisions accentuate perceptions of conflict.9 Demands for social and political equality can be based on the reality of inequality compounded by the existence of ethnic differences.10 The ethnic composition of ruling elites can create differential access to power for different ethnic groups,11 and differences among ethnic or national groups can impede national cohesion.

(7) Large scale migration across national borders is often induced by political problems in sending countries and/or by economic incentives in receiving countries. The scale of such migration may have profound effects on relations among nations.12

(8) Social institutions can act as powerful inhibiters or absorbers of conflict. Institutions capable of adjusting to changing environments can cushion the effects of demographic changes. When institutions become outmoded, there may be an upsurge of conflict. A lag in institutional adaptation can accentuate conflict poten tials." Delays in management of the changes in a physical setting can exacerbate conflict.4

(9) Population-regulating policies in themselves can create conflict. This is a phenomenon too often overlooked. For example, policies that encourage selective immigration or, alternatively, discourage mobility across national borders often create conflict. Paradoxically, such policies, which are often advocated as a means of reducing conflict or as an outcome of existing conflict, can in themselves create new population-related conflicts.

(10) Despite the importance of perceptions in assigning meaning to conflict situations, the realities of scarcities and pressures are the most powerful determinants of conflict.

TABLE 4

VIOLENT CONFLICTS SUMMARY

BY REGIONS AND TIME PERIODS